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STATISTICAL ANALYSIS

Do Hitters Boost Their Performance
During Their Contract Years?
Evidence from the 2006- 11 Collective Bargaining Agreement's Years Says "Yes"

Heather M. O'Neill, PhD
ach season, baseball fans and journalists alike
identify which players are in the final years of
their contracts because a lot rides on how the
players produce in their "contract year." Will a player
boost his effort and performance in an effort to improve
his value and bargaining power? Or will he crumble
under the pressure? Or are players' performances uncorrelated with where they stand in their contract
cycles? Legendary manager Sparky Anderson believed
players rose to the occasion in their contract years declaring, "Just give me 25 guys on the last year of their
contract; I'll win a pennant every year. " 1 Although anecdotal evidence abounds, this paper uses a robust data

players to perform well to win games and championships and secure fan enthusiasm. In contract
negotiations, how a player has performed over his career serves as an imperfect predictor of his future
performance. If players believe that team owners
weigh a player's most recent season more heavily than
preceding years, it sets the stage for the contract year
phenomenon. The attraction of a lucrative future contract provides ample incentive for a player to put in
additional time and effort to boost performance in his
contract year. After signing a new guaranteed contract,
both pay and contract length are set regardless of
actual performance, which removes the previous incentive.4 For longer-term contracts, this may lead to
shirking. Eventually, a new contract year arrives and
the incentive to boost performance reappears.
Difficulty arises in separating the individual performance of a baseball player from his team's
capabilities. This proves especially true for pitchers
since decisions made about their pitch selection, pitch
location, and strategy may depend on their team's
fielding proficiency and the strength of the bullpen.
For a hitter, ilie type of pitch he sees may depend in
part on the hitters adjacent to him in the lineup and
the situation. This paper analyzes individual data on
hitters (position players), railier than pitchers, while
cognizant of the potential measurement errors. Adjusted OPS (OPS 100) serves as the measure of the
hitter's performance. Although random variations in
OPSlOO from one year to ilie next can occur, it is unlikely for a large group of players that above average
performances would randomly occur during contract
years. I contend that effort and performance change
from one year to the next depending upon where the
player sits in his contract cycle.
Major League Baseball's use of salary arbitration,
contract extensions, and free agency provides avenues
for enhanced contract conditions for players. This
paper focuses on free agents with six or more years of
MLB service for the following four reasons:

E

sPt

.:ind appropriate player-specific econometric model-

ing highlighted in O'Neill to show that Anderson was
right- players' performances improve during their contract years. 2 To find the answer requires following
players throughout their careers to tease out changes
predicated on contract status, rather than comparing
players to one another given their contract status.
For example, in the last year of a three-year contract
with the Mariners in 2006, Raul Ibanez sported an .869
OPS (on-base plus slugging percentage), up from .792
OPS the previous year. 3 He subsequently signed an $11
million, two-year contract with tl1e Mariners. In his next
contract year, 2008, his OPS of .837 slightly exceeded
his 2007 OPS of .831. Ibanez then signed a $31.5 million,
three-year contract with the Phillies. At the end of that
deal, in 2011, lbaiiez's .707 OPS dipped lower than his
previous year's OPS of .793 and the Yankees signed hjm
to a one-year deal at $1. 1 million. Two of Ibaiiez's three
contract years show boosts in performance, while the
third demonstrates a significant drop. He was also 39
years old in 2011, suggesting age must be accounted for
while searching for the answer.
The parties in contract negotiations- players,
agents, and team owners-understand that incentives
affect performance and that performance impacts pay
and contract length. Players seek job security, income,
and championships, while profit-seeking owners want
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(l) free agency is associated with the greatest
financial gains for players as teams bid for
players' services;

as discussed in O'Neill.9 Analyzing data on hitters between 2001 and 2004, Dinerstein uses seemingly
unrelated regression (SUR) and finds statistically significant increases in a hitter's SLG during his contract
year. 10 Interestingly, from the ream owners· perspectives,
Dinerstein finds that consistency of a player's performance mattered more than the most recent performance.
If teams are seeking consistency, they will pay for it,
and players will begin to aim for steady hitting performances. If Dinerstein is correct, we should see a
reduction toward zero in the magnitude of the contract
year boost. Hummel and O'Neill employ fixed effects
estimation with data on free agents playing 2004- 08
and find 4.2-5.5 percent boosts in OPS during contract
years. 11 They note that players intending to retire no
longer have financial incentive to boost effort, although
they may desire to go out on top. Their results suggest
the former effect dominates, shown by an 11.2- 13.2 percent decrease in OPS for retiring players in the last year
of their contracts, after controlling the diminishment of
performance due to age and age-related injury.

(2) al least sLx years uf service eual.Jle more ol.Jservations per player to capture more robust
results;

(3) free agents with fewer than six years are
those who have been demoted to the minors
or released; and
(4) there will be a sufficient number of players
who may retire at the end of their contract
year, an intention that is expected to impact
contract year performance.
PREVIOUS RESEARCH FINDINGS
Previous research on MLB contract year performance
shows mixed results. As detailed in O'Neill, the choice
of performance measure and statistical technique employed often create contradictory results. 5 Researchers
generally analyze hitters, believing hitting statistics are
less contaminated by team play than pitching statistics. The use of slugging percentage (SLG), at bats
(ABs), days on the disabled list (DL). wins above replacement player, OPS, and runs created per 27 outs
(R27), show the range of offensive performance measures investigated. Given differences in players'
abilities, changes in a player's output should be relative to his ability, indicating why several studies use
the deviation between current and three-year moving
average of a player's offensive statistics to capture
changes in a player's output. A deviation-based model
by Maxcy et al. finds no significant change in SLG for
players in their contract year. 6 Maxcy et al. does find
that players seeking new contracts spend fewer days
on the DL and have more ABs, contending they do so
to make themselves more attractive to team owners.
Birnbaum does not find a boost in R27 during contract
years, whereas Perry does using WARP_ 7 .s
Using ordinary least squares (OLS) regression enables one to predict changes in output during the
contract year while controlling for observable player
traits, such as age, years of MLB experience, team success, etc. However, compiling data on many players
(cross sectional data) over several years played (lime
series dataJ creates a "panel" dataset. OLS estimation
leads to biased results with panel data. Previous studies show robust statistical evidence of the contract year
boost when using appropriate panel data estimation
techniques, whereas those applying OLS models do not,

ABILITY, EFFORT, AND PERFORMANCE
Team owners and general managers observe differences in players' performances through easily
available statistics. The rlifference hetween inn;:ite ;ihility and effort, however, which together account for the
differences in players' performances, proves difficult
to discern. In a given year, a player's ability generally
remains relatively constant, but his effort can change
and lead to differences in perfonnance levels. While
unlikely that effort changes much during a game, offseason effort and effort between games in-season can
vary. Players can exert effort to enhance their productivity by engaging in more intense workouts, restricted
leisure activities, and eating healthier diets.
Players alter their effort when their interest dictates. If players believe team owners place greater
weights on more recent performances, this motivates
players to increase their effort and (ideally) performance during their contract year. But if players perceive
that owners value consistent performance, then boosting performance in the contract year remains unlikely.
When a player intends to retire at the end of the contract cycle, the incentive to perform and acquire
another contract disappears, which is expected to reduce effort and performance during all years of the
final contract, including the last year.
MULTIPLE REGRESSION MODEL TO ESTIMATE ADJUSTED
ON BASEPLUS SLUGGING PERCENTAGE
The dependent variable for this study is OPSlOO,
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preferred over OPS because it accounts for league play
and the player's home baseball park. This offensive
measure accounts for power and reaching base frequently, two events contributing to scoring runs.
OPSlOO uue:; uol tlepentl upon playing time and captures offensive prowess better than RBis, batting
average, HRs, etc. 12 Albert and Bennett find OPS a better predictor of scoring runs than its two components
separately. 13 Barry Bonds holds the single-season
record for unadjusted OPS at 1.4217 in 2004 when his
SLG was .812 and his OBA was .609. 14 During that season he typically walked or hit a home run during a
plate appearance.
The suggested regression model for OPS 100 for
player i in season tis (formula 1)

sign a new contract. He may willingly choose to retire,
retire reluctantly due to advanced age or injuries, or be
forced to retire because no team is willing to hire him
despite his desire to keep playing. Unfortunately, it is
.not feasible to know which case prevails for all players.
The variable NOPLAY = 1 denotes a player is not on a
MLB team the year after a contract year and NOPLAY = 0 indicates he is on a roster. If NOPLAY switches
from 0 to l because a player willingly chooses to retire,
the expected impact is a decrease in OPSIOO due to the
Jack of incentive to sign another contract. If NOPLAY
switches for one of the other reasons for retirement, it
may be due to a low OPSlOO, in which case the impact
of NOPLAY on OPS100 is biased. To mitigate the
bias and introduce the potential reasons behind retirement-advanced age, injuries, and poor
(+I (+)
(+J
1-l
performance-a new variable that predicts
OPSI00.1 ~ + 131* GAMES.,1+131* Pl.AYOFfr1+13l* PROBRETi1 + j3i• COl'flRACTYR,,
the likelihood of retirement is created, PROBRET, following work by Krautmann and
Solow. 17 The estimated probability of retirewhere: GAMES represents the number of games
ment, discussed and shown later, is used to predict the
played; PLAYOFF is a binary variable equal to l when
retirement intention for each player for each year. Using
the player's team makes the playoffs and O otherwise;
PROBRET instead of NOPLAY as an independent variPROBRET is the estimated probability of retirement;
able reduces bias. Players who choose to retire do not
and CONTRACTYR is a dummy variable denoting
seek another contract, therefore are expected to have a
whPthPr sp;:ison t is ;:i contract year ( = 1) or not ( = O).
lower OPSIOO_ Additionally, a player with a low OPSIOO
The sign above each coefficient denotes the expected
is more likely to have a higher probability of retirement
impact on OPSIOO given an increase in the independas he goes unsigned or reluctantly hangs up his cleats.
ent variable, holding all else constant. The stochastic
These suggest B3 < 0.
error comprises two terms impacting a player's
MLB hitters are expected to engage in opportunistic
performance: ai is the unobserved player effect reprebehavior and increase their performance during the
senting all time-invariant factors that cannot be
contract year, thus B4 > o_ This presumes team owners
measured or observed, such as innate ability, work
value the most recent performance as a solid indicator
ethic, drive, etc.; and µi,t represents random errors,
of future performance, making way for the contract year
due to accidents, weather, etc_ 15
boost. CONTRACTYR is the only independent variable
The GAMES and PLAYOFF variables serve as conin (1) that satisfies causal inference, rather than simply
trol variables to mitigate potential bias. Playing more
correlation, since a player's contract status is known
a priori.
games helps a player gain confidence at the plate,
likely raising his OPSlOO. Similarly, players with higher
OPSIOO statistics likely play in more games. The exDATA
pected positive association between OPS 100 and
Data are collected on all free agent hitters playing durGAMES implies ~l > 0. Several reasons suggest ~2 > 0.
ing the most recently completed 2006-11 Collective
Jf a player's team is in the playoff hunt, he is expected
Bargaining Agreement (CBA) who had six or more years
to boost his performance to help his team make the
of MLB experience, a minimum of two years of obserplayoffs and potentially win a championship. Teams
vation, and played in at least seven games in a year.
in a playoff race may trade for high performing hitters
Choosing players under the same CBA helps reduce potential impacts due to changes in CBAs, since all players
at the trade deadline, suggesting another reason for the
and team owners are subject to the same contract and
positive association. A financial incentive to perform
better also exists, since team members earn playoff
free agency guidelines, and revenue-sharing rules. 18
revenues. Lastly, higher OPSIOO figures may lead to
Signing new local and national TV contracts also affect
revenue-sharing streams and hence salaries, but these
teams making the playoffs. 16
are not captured in the data set.
At the end of a player's contract, he may or may not

=
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Hitters with one-year and longer-term contracts are
used. Players with longer term contracts generally represent those with higher ability; eliminating those with
one-year contraccs would potentially bias the results. 19
Ultimately, 256 MLB free agent hitters meet the data
selection criteria. The panel dataset is unbalanced,
meaning the number of observations per player need
not be the same.
ESPN.com's Major League Baseball Free Agent
Tracker lists the positions played, age, current team
and new team unless re-signed, for all free agents in
each year. Players who do not receive another contract
are listed as retired or free agent again. Baseball-Reference.com provides OPSlOO statistics, the number of
games played each season, and the year in which a
player debuted in the major leagues. Josh Herrnsmeyer
unselfishly provided me with the number of days on
the disabled list (DL) for all players in 2006-09 from
his MLB Injury Report. Backseat Fan (2010) and FanGraphs (20ll) provide the days on the disabled list for
players in 2010 and 2011, respectively. For players who
change teams via an in-season trade, the playoff status
of the final team is used.
Table 1 presents the format of the unbalanced data
set for two players. The first player is outfielder (POSITION= 9) Bobby Abreu, given ;in irlentific;ition c:orlP
of 2, who was 32 years old in 2006. Abreu appears on
MLB rosters in all six years of the 2006-2011 CSA and
with the Dodgers in 2012, thus NOPLAY = O for all of
his years. In his 2008 contract year and prior year, he
played with the Yankees, having been traded from the
Phillies in 2006. The Yankees made the playoffs in
2006 and 2007 but not in 2008, shown by PLAYOFF = 1
and 0, respectively. In 2007, Abreu shows an OPSlOO
of 113 playing in 158 games, compared to his OPSlOO
of 120 in 156 games in his 2008 contract year. Abreu
debuted in the majors in 1996, implying 11 years of experience (EXP) by 2006. With no days on the DL over
the six years, DL= 0.

Table 1. Unbalanced Dataset Example
NAME
Bobby.tlbreu
Bobby.tlbreu
Bobby Abreu
Bobby.tlbreu
Bobby.tlbreu
Bobby.tlbreu
Moises Alou
Moises Alou
Moises Alou

Moises Rojas Alou signed
as a free agent with the
San Francisco Giants before the 2005 season, and
with the Mets before the
2007 season. He would
play 2007 and 2008 with
the Mets.

Bobby Abreu moved mid-season in 2006 from the Phillies to the
Yankees by trade, then went to the Angels in 2009 as a free agent.

.

CODE YR YEAR
2

1

2

2

2

3
4

2
2
2
4
4
4

s
6
l
2

3

TEAM
AGE CONTY EAR OPS100
2006 Phll/Yank 32
126
0
2007
Yank
33
0
113
2008
Yank
34
1
120
2009 Anael
JS
0
118
2010
An11el
36
0
118
2011
Anul
37
105
0

2006
2007
2008

Giant
Mets

40

Mets

41

39

1
0
1

132
137
107
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GAMES POSITlm NOPLA~

156
158

156

152
lS4

142
98
87
15

9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9

EXP PLAYOFF

0
0
0
0

14

0

15

0
0
0
1

16
17

11
12
13

18
i9

1
1
0
1
0
0
0
0
0

DL
0
0
0
0
0
0

so
76
163
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The second player, outfielder Moises Alou, shows
two contract years, in 2006 with the San Francisco
Giants and in 2008 with the New York Mets. He had 15
years of MLB experience by 2006 at age 39. Alou did
not play on a MLB learn iu 2009, thus NOPLAY= 1 fur
2008. His teams did not make the playoffs in any of
the three years. Injuries led to increasing numbers of
days on the DL and fewer games played between 2006
and 2007, and by 2008 two major injuries limit Alou's
playing time to only 15 games with 163 days on the
DL. Three observations for Alou and six for Abreu indicate an unbalanced dataset.
Sorting the descriptive statistics by contract year
status, interesting results appear in Table 2. The differences in means for all variables, except playoffs and
days on the DL, are statistically significantly different
at p < .001. There are 546 player-year observations for
contract years and 470 for non-contract years. The
average OPSlOO for the contract year is 85.9 compared
to 97 .2 for the non-contract year, which appears contrary to the contract year boost hypothesis. This
contrary result arises chiefly from the ex-post retirements (NOPLAY = 1) of 23.1 percent in the contract
year observations swamping the 3.2 percent in the
non-contract year that may be due to poorer hitters receiving only one year contracts. Ten fewer average
games played in the contract year observations also
suggests that less capable hitters have shorter contracts. Comparing the two means proves misleading
and too simplistic. Predicting OPSlOO via appropriate
regression analysis can account for the influence of retirement and other factors to offer a more robust test
of the contract year phenomenon.

GAMES, since higher ability players are likely to play
in more games. Suppose higher ability players do have
higher OPSlOOs and that playing in more games does
increase OPSlOO. Ignoring the influence of ability, as in
the case of OLS, means that GAMES receives more
credit than warranted as the cause of the high OPSlOO.
Consequently, the estimated coefficient of l will be
positively biased. Similarly, if a player has an exceptional (albeit non-measurable) work ethic, he will
likely contribute more to his team success and increase
his team's chances of making the playoffs. This implies an expected positive correlation between a; and
PLAYOFF. If high OPSlOOs are attributable to both
strong work ethics and playing on a playoff team, then
the estimated coefficient of 2 will also be positively
biased in OLS. 20 Eliminating bias requires a different
technique, namely fixed effects (FE) estimation.
Studying a player's motivation to perform across the
contract cycle suggests concentrating on the withinplayer behavior. Estimating how each player alters his
effort and performance over his contract cycle must be
measured against his metrics, not against those of others. FE estimation calculates the mean of each variable
over time for each player and subtracts it from the actual observation for each year to demean the data. For
example, Bohhy Ahre11's .werage OPSlOO over his six
years of playing is 116.5, which is subtracted from his
actual OPSlOO for each of his six years to yield six
deviations or demeaned observations for his OPSlOO.
After doing so for all players, the demeaned dependent
variable of OPSIOO is regressed on the demeaned independent variables via OLS producing the fixed
effects within-player coefficients. Time-invariant unobserved traits in ai, such as ability, have demeaned values
of zero, eliminating them from affecting outcomes.
Dropping out the unobserved traits via demeaning eliminates correlations and associated biases between
unobserved traits and independent variables. 21
While FE estimation addresses bias and focuses on
changes in players' behaviors, it comes with a cost.
Finding statistical significance for estimated coefficients may be compromised. The variation in OPSIOO

ORDINARYLEAST SQUARESVERSUS FIXED EFFECTS ESTIMATION
Given panel data, estimation of the model via ordinary
least squares (OLS) may be inappropriate due to omitted variable bias that occurs when immeasurable
player characteristics in the error term a; are correlated
with some independent variables. For example, a
player's ability, captured in ai, is expected to be positively correlated with the number of games he plays,

Table 2. Descriptive Statistics for Contract Year versus Non-Contract Year
N
OPS100
NOPLAY
AGE
DL
EXP
PLAYOFF
GAMES

546
5'6

546
546
546
546
546

CONTRACT YEAR
MEAN
ST. DEV. MINIMUM MAXIMUN
85.9
30.41
-21
182
Q_42
0 .231
0
1
33.59
3.28
26
48
19.39
33.74
0
163
7
11 .6
3.29
26
0.333
0.47
0
1
95.23
..0.57
162
7
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N
470
470

470
470
470
470
470

NON-CONTRACT YEAR
ST. DEV. MINIMUM MAXIMUM
29.87
-39
192
0.032
0.18
0
1
47
32.25
3.02
24
17.53
31.99
0
193
10.6
3
6
25
0.309
0.46
0
1
115.49
162
36.88
10
MEAN
97.2

O'NEILL: Do Hitter Boost Their Performance During Their Contract Years?
across 256 players is expected to be much greater than
the variation in OPSIOO for individual players over
their free agency careers. For example, the dataset
shows a range in OPSlOO from -39 to 192 with a standard deviation of 30.67, while Bobby Abreu·s only
vary between 105 and 126 with a 7.09 standard deviation. Other players generally have smaller OPSlOO
deviations too. Since FE estimation concentrates on
the within-player variation and dismisses the betweenplayer differences in OPSlOO, it reduces the sample
variation in OPSlOO and lessens the likelihood of statistical significance for the estimated coefficients.
Demeaning the data also reduces the degrees of freedom by 255, further diminishing chances of statistical
significance. Therefore, finding a statistically significant FE result for 4, in spite of these perils, occurs
because evidence from the dataset is compelling.

timated slope coefficients are in parentheses below the
estimates. (formula 3)
PROBRET =-3.38 + .l57*EXP + .ooo·EXPl + .ooo4•DL- .004*0PS100
(.0475) (.0001) (.135) (.001)
C0trettly Predicted= 94%"

Days on the disabled list do not statistically predict
likelihood of retiring, but remaining variables do. Each
additional year of MLB experience increases the likelihood of retiring exponentially and a one point increase
in OPSlOO reduces it the probability of retirement by .4
percent . Since the -3.38 intercept pertains to the last
player's last year, the predicted output for al! players
for all years occur as changes from -3.38. For brevity,
they are not provided. For example, Bobby Abreu
could have retired after his 2008 contract year, but his
predicted probability was .001 (near zero) and he did
not retire. 24 His likelihood rose to 1.5 percent in 2009
due to his two point decrease in OPSlOO and extra year
of experience. By 2010, despite no change in his
OPSlOO from 2009, the additional year playing leads
to a probability of 12.7 percent. In 2011, his sixteenth
year in the majors and drop in OPSlOO to 104 increases
his likelihood to 33 percent. For Moises Alou the
model predicted a 60 percent chance of retirement following his 2008 season, when he did in fact retire. The
predicted values of PROBRET for all 1, 106 observations
are calculated and ultimately used to estimate (1).

ESTIMATING THE PROBABILITY OF RETIRING
Players generally retire at the end of a contract. However, the predicted probability of retiring can change
over time until actual retirement occurs and it should
be considered by the team owner during negotiations.
A player's likelihood of retiring depends on how many
years he has played, how many days have been spent
on the DL, and his offensive performance per Krautmann and Solow.ii Equation (2) denotes the regression
equation for the probability of retirement for player i in
season t as (formula 2)

RESULTSFROM ESTIMATING OPSl 00
Regression model (1) derives from two improvements in the model estimated in
O'Neill.25 First, traditional theory suggests that
as players age, their offensive performance increases at
a decreasing rate as they become more comfortable in
hitting, until it peaks, and eventually declines as age
depreciates hitting skills. O'Neill includes the quadratic form of age, AGE and AGE squared, as
independent variables impacting OPSlOO. Additionally,
O'Neill's PROBRET estimation employs performance,
injury, and the quadratic form of years of experience in
place of age. O'Neill finds the odd result that OPSlOO
increases at an increasing rate after age 33. Having age
enter PROBRET through its correlation with years of
experience, and then using PROBRET along with age
in predicting OPSlOO, may have led to that usual result. Second, O'Neill segregated catchers and
shortstops as defensive players, believing that they
sport lower OPSlOO statistics in exchange for better defensive play. However, since FE estimation demeans
the data and players who are shortstops or catchers
generally do not change positions, it does not seem appropriate to segregate them.

Players with more years of experience are expected
to have increasingly greater likelihoods of retiring
since they have signed several contracts and amassed
income. Additionally, the aging process that accompanies years of experience takes its toll on bodies often
coinciding with familial demands to be home more
often. With EXP2 representing years of experience
squared, a1 > 0 and az > 0 are expected. More days on
the DL are expected to increase PRO BRET, i.e., al> 0,
since injuries inhibit playing ability and reduce interest by team owners. If a decline in OPS 100 portends
reduced future performance, it increases retirement
likelihood, a4 < 0. The stochastic error comprises both
the unobserved time-invariant player traits ai and unmeasured time-variant traits Vt such as family issues.
Using NOPLAY as the dependent variable, estimating (2) via FE leads to the linear probability model (3)
below. Since NOPLAY is determined after the season,
all of the independent variables yield causal inference.
The p-values for one-tailed hypotheses tests for the es-
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The 1,016 player-year observations yielding equation (4) presents the FE multiple regression equation
for predicted OPSlOO (OPSlOO") with one-tailed p-values in parenthesis. 26 The Buse-R2 indicates that 78
pen:eul uf the varialim1 i11 adjusted OPS is explained
by the model with these independent variables. 27
Games played and being on a playoff team indicate the
expected positive sign, but they are not statistically significant at 5 percent.(formula 4)

player traits pervasive with OLS estimation, the data
show strong support for the contract year boost. From
FE estimation, two important contract year findings
follow. First, the adjusted OPS of a free agent hitter in
his contract year is expected to be 6. 7 percent greater
than in non-contract year periods-higher than previously noted studies. Second, "retiring" players show a
decline in their contract year performance and any
models which ignore retirement will be misspecified.
OLS estimation of the same dataset (not shown) yields
a negative impact on OPSlOO during the contract year,
albeit not statistically significant. This biased result coincides with the contrary findings in Table 2 that show
lower average OPSlOO for contract year observations
than non-contract year observations.
The model may prove helpful during contract negotiations as one can compare a hitter's actual
performance relative to expectations. Take Albert Pujols as an example. In 2008 and 2009, his OPSlOO
statistics of 192 and 189 greatly exceeded his predicted
statistics of 175 and 176, respectively. In 2010, his
OPS 100 dropped to 173 to his expected value. In
2011-his contract year-the model predicts an
OPSIOO of 155, yet he hit only 148. Despite two years
of declining OPS100 values that failed to meet the
morlel's Pxpectations, the Angels still signed Pujols to
a 10-year, $240 million contract. His OPS100 has continued to decline, dropping to 138 in 2012 and 117 in
2013. This type of post-contract performance leads me
to the next related research project: whether players
shirk after getting a new long term contract. •

OPSIOO" = 114.52 + .WGAMES + .60•PlAYOFF- 100.34APROBRET +
(.091) (.321) (.0001)

+ 6.11• CONTRACTYR
(.0001)

R2=.78

The highly significant PROBRET coefficient says that

a one percentage point increase in the likelihood of retiring reduces expected adjusted OPS by 1.0034 points
or 1.1 percent decline relative to the mean OPS 100 of
91.12. A 10 percentage point increase in the likelihood
of retiring, about one half standard deviation in PROBRET, reduces predicted adjusted OPS by 10.034 points.
The estimated model provides evidence of the contract year phenomenon, but the phenomenon depends
upon the likelihood of retirement. If a player is in a
contract year, holding all else constant, the expected
incrPase in his arljnstPrl OPS is 6.11 points or 6. 7 pPrcent increase relative to the mean. But for two
otherwise identical players, one in his contract year
and the other not, the expected OPSlOO for the former
is 6.11 points higher. Using the Grossman heuristic that
every .100 increase in OPS raises salary by $2,000,000
and converting OPS to OPSlOO enables monetizing the
6.11 bump. 2s The contract year boost is expected to increase annual salary by $470,000, about 15.2 percent
of the average salary of $3 .1 million in 2011.
The impact from the likelihood of retiring offsets
the contract year boost. Each additional percentage
point increase in a contract year player's retirement
probability reduces the 6.11 boost by l.0034. A complete offset of no expected change in OPSlOO during
the contract year occurs with a jump in retirement likelihood of about 6.1 (6.11/1.0034) points. With years
of experience driving retirement likelihood exponentially, a decline in expected OPSlOO reasonably appears
at the end of contracts for players with many years of
experience. For instance, a 10-point increase in the
probability of retirement leads to a 3.9 (6.11-10.034)
decline in expected OPSlOO during a contract year.
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